日本史における“近代”の再考察 : 戦前日本帝国の近代化の概念 by SEWELL Bill
Reconsidering the Modern in Japanese History :
Modernity in the Service of the Prewar
Japanese Empire
著者 SEWELL  Bill
journal or
publication title
Nichibunken Japan review : Jourmal of the










Reconsidering the Modern in Japanese History:
Modernity in the Service of the Prewar
Japanese Empire
Bill SEWELL
St. Mary’s University, Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada
Although historians have typically portrayed Japanese imperialism in Asia as
motivated primarily by economic or atavistic concerns, this essay suggests
that cultural dimensions were more important for many, if not most, of the
architects of Japan’s prewar empire. A consideration for how Japanese went
about defining modernity in the first half of the twentieth century and how
they applied varying definitions of the term to the creation of the Japanese
empire in Manchuria reveals that many Japanese genuinely thought their
efforts to be progressive, reflecting as they did trends apparent in Japanese
society at home. Indeed, creating a modern Japan entailed the creation of not
merely an empire, but of an appropriate empire, and one that in key ways
prefigured the implementation of new visions of modernity in Japan itself.
The centrality of these attitudes was such that they may help  explain why
many Japanese today continue to feel little need to apologize to their Asian
neighbors for prewar Japanese activities. A secondary concern of this essay is
theoretical, suggesting that modernity should be conceived more as a cultural
artifact involving broadly shared values and goals subject to constant reevalu-
ation rather than as a problematic abstraction. It is an ever-shifting aspira-
tion, one that encourages individuals to reconsider and reconfigure their
environments as those environments evolve. Or we might say—responding
to Bruno Latour—we are still modern.  
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Years of the modern! years of the unperform’d!
Your horizon rises—I see it parting away for more august dramas,
I see not America only, not only Liberty’s nation but other nations preparing,
I see tremendous entrances and exits, new combinations, the solidarity of races,
I see that force advancing with irresistible power on the world’s stage.
(Have the old forces, the old wars, played their parts? are the acts suitable to them closed?)
Walt Whitman (1819-1892)1
Japan Review, 2004, 16:213-258
213
Coinciding roughly with Japan’s emergence from seclusion, Walt Whitman’s joyous
celebration of the modern garnered meaningful praise among late Meiji Japanese literati.2
While Uchimura Kanzo¯ ???? (1861-1930) apparently first introduced Whitman to
Japan3, a young Natsume So¯seki ???? (1867-1916) proclaimed Whitman’s happy
arrival as that of “a great man descending from heaven.”4 Japanese fascination with
Whitman did not end there.5 While some began translating Whitman’s oeuvre,6 others
began to write in his style.7 So rapidly did Whitman gain prominence in Japan that
Lafcadio Hearn sought to warn Japanese against Whitman’s influence.8
It was Whitman’s vision of heroic progress that provoked this fascination—both in
substance and in style. On the surface, Whitman, who grew up amid the jubilant tur-
moil of a booming New York City, sought to capture the essence of life in a new age by
providing it with a new poetic style, one more appropriate for a fresh and exciting era. A
deeper consideration reveals that contrasting with antebellum, anti-modern views ema-
nating from the south, Whitman represented important evolutionary transitions appar-
ent in wider society, including the expansion of a commercial and liberal middle class
(including its sensibilities), the advent of industrial capitalism, and the triumph of new
technologies.9 He noted with special approval the rising significance of the average man.10
Despite occasional misgivings late in life, Whitman’s vision of the modern was optimistic
and progressive, rendering him for many a veritable prophet of the modern.11
Just what, however, does “modern” mean? For scholars, its ambiguity poses an inter-
esting challenge. It can, for example, as easily refer to examples of twentieth century
architecture as it can to pieces of nineteenth century art or literature or even to certain
sixteenth- and seventeenth-century philosophers. The term’s flexibility also enables the
classification of the most recent three or four centuries in world history as belonging to
either the “early modern” or “modern” eras, even though distinguishing the transition
from one era to the next is not always a simple task.
Despite this confusion, the term is not without its uses—hence its continued wide
circulation. This essay suggests that the term can be especially useful if considered with
the progressive and strident presumptions implicit in the perspectives of Whitman and
his kind. These people looked upon the unfolding of an explicitly modern world favor-
ably, if not impatiently. What is more, likeminded individuals could be found not only
throughout society, but throughout the world. In this case, the poets were not alone.
With regard to Japan, perhaps the most pointed recent statement to this effect can be
found in the work of Sheldon Garon. Indeed, Garon goes so far as to assert that a con-
sideration for modernity is essential if one is to understand the general course of twenti-
eth century Japanese history. His examination of the pivotal roles played by reformist
Japanese bureaucrats illustrates well that their underlying impulses were fundamentally
and consciously modern.12
At the same time, Garon’s work also usefully calls attention to the darker aspects of
these efforts, for in order to implement modernity, many of the progressives pursuing the
modern encouraged more authoritarian forms of government. In a similar vein, Louise
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Young has noted the dual nature of modern impulses involved in the creation of the
puppet state of Manchukuo ???.13 Just as the seizure of Manchuria14 by the Kanto¯gun
???15 —or Guandong (Kwantung) Army—led inexorably to further expansion and
war, it facilitated also the influence of certain elements within Japanese society. In this
view, imperialism becomes not simply something Japanese implemented outside of the
country—imperialism becomes central to developing a modern state and society at home
as well.16 Young, however, goes one step further than Garon, noting that modernist pro-
jects in Manchukuo were ultimately unstable: “[b]y the advent of the Pacific War,
Manchukuo was clearly destroying itself from within.”17 Modernity in Manchuria
included its discontents.
These efforts are inspiring, molding and polishing as they do a powerful lens for
scholarly use. This is timely because historical scholarship—especially that concerned
with Japan—has been long vexed by the shadow of an earlier means of conceiving the
modern, that of modernization theory. This was a perspective that implicitly asserted a
discoverable developmental road to a teleologically satisfactory end—that achieved by
“the West” (whatever that term may mean) itself.18 As such it was a perspective that later
historians challenged not only for its utility but also for its validity.19 So great was the
ensuing revulsion against modernization theory that until recently any use of the “m-
word” by historians became practically taboo.
It is for helping to overcome this aversion that recent scholarship concerned with
modernity in Japan and its empire is to be applauded. However, a close reading of this
literature suggests that a gap yet remains. While Garon examines events within Japan,
Young focuses on events in one corner of the Japanese empire chiefly as they played out
in Japan. Missing is a focused discussion of the Japanese creation of the modern in the
empire overseas. Fortunately, some recent work is beginning to address this gap,20 work
best described as studies of colonial modernity.21
This essay seeks to contribute to this effort by outlining some of the ways in which
modernity is useful—if not indispensable—to understand how Japanese went about con-
structing their prewar empire. Not simply an array of idiosyncratic personal endeavors,
creating the modern was a shared endeavor, resulting in the constitution of a broadly—
but not completely—shared culture that defined modernity according to specific refer-
ence points. Through practice and debate, however, shared goals and values changed,
resulting in identifiable eras as short as a decade or two.
This phenomenon is evident in Japanese activities in prewar Manchuria. After briefly
considering aspects of the emergent Meiji state relevant to imperialist endeavors, this
essay addresses the creation of modernity in the two eras of Japanese imperialism appar-
ent in Manchuria: that occurring before the Manchurian Incident of September 18,
1931 and that occurring after the military seizure of the region.22 Providing both justifi-
cation and a program for Japanese activities, visions of the modern galvanized Japanese
in Manchuria into divergent courses of action, each course demonstrating rival defini-
tions of the modern. Each era offers a window through which currents in both
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Manchurian as well as Japanese societies can be assessed.
Despite these differences, taken together, Manchurian modernities also reveal that in
extending their control, many if not most Japanese consistently thought they were acting
in a progressive manner. Indeed, modernist projects in both eras in Manchuria proved to
be no sideshows23—they were significant for contemporary modernist projects in Japan
itself. This helps explain why so many Japanese in those years supported the kinds of
activities occurring in places like Manchuria that growing numbers of Chinese and other
foreigners increasingly challenged. Moreover, the influence of prewar modernist projects
has remained considerable through the postwar period, and this may help explain why
many Japanese have found it difficult to apologize for many prewar activities.
On a theoretical level, this essay also hopes to encourage a more practical definition
of modernity. Rather than perceive modernity as a kind of broadly shared stage in
human evolution25—a stage that some assert is more imagined than real26—it makes
more sense to conceive modernity as a continuously unfolding project, an ever-distant
goal beckoning energetic minds to improve their current situations in ways best seen fit.27
This means, then, that modernity is not a constant. Influenced by factors both indige-
nous and foreign, modernity is constantly reinvented to fit new contexts and meet new
needs. A cultural construct, modernity itself evolves.28
MODERNITY IN MEIJI JAPAN
I see Freedom, completely arm’d and victorious and very haughty, with Law on 
one side and Peace on the other,
A stupendous trio all issuing forth against the idea of caste;
What historic denouements are these we so rapidly approach?
I see men marching and countermarching by swift millions,
I see the frontiers and boundaries of the old aristocracies broken,
I see the landmarks of European kings removed,
I see this day the People beginning their landmarks, (all others give way;)
The pursuit of modernity in Meiji Japan provided the launching pad for creating
modernity in Manchuria. Reviewing this experience, however, reveals that it was not a
straightforward process. It involved continuous debate, practice, and assessment. It
proved also to be a process that was inherently international—not only because of the
search for foreign models, but because it required the creation of an empire.
The Meiji era witnessed extraordinarily widespread and far-reaching changes in
Japanese society, changes usually portrayed as progressive. Not only did Japanese perceive
these changes in this light, but so did many foreigners, and it was largely because of these
changes that foreign powers became willing to terminate the unequal treaties that pro-
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tected them from what they thought were barbarous legal and other practices. Notably,
while Japan regained tariff and legal autonomy by 1911—only some fifty years after the
imposition of the unequal treaties—not until the era of the Second World War did
China do so, and then only with support from the United States.
Although some attribute Japan’s transformations to progressive government leader-
ship, it is important to recall that Japanese society at large was receptive to new ways.
Indeed, despite some challenges—perhaps most notably the 1877 Satsuma Rebellion—
the creation of a Meiji modernity was a genuinely popular phenomenon.29 This was pos-
sible because despite Japan’s long era of seclusion, there occurred a gradual erosion of the
samurai order that rendered society ripe to embrace new forms of social organization.30
This is evident in the twin Meiji slogans promoting change, bunmei kaika (????,
“civilization and enlightenment”) and fukoku kyo¯hei (???? “rich country and strong
army”), were embraced popularly, enabling Japanese society as a whole to address per-
ceived weaknesses with speed.31 As a result, Meiji efforts proved surprisingly successful,
enabling Japan to join a second wave of states embracing industrial capitalism.32 This is
why such efforts extended beyond the political and economic realms to include many
facets of Japanese life, including efforts to redefine mores, school curricula, proper ways
of dress, and the built environment.33 Creating modernity in Meiji was a cultural activity.
Despite—or because of—this popularity, deciding what constituted modernity did
not proceed smoothly. The definition took shape haphazardly, requiring both debate as
well as trial and error.34 This was in part because Meiji’s modernity did not follow foreign
blueprints. After selectively studying foreign models, Japanese usually adapted imported
ways carefully to suit their own needs. Even then, fine-tuning was required.35 (Of course,
in one way this endeavor involved nothing new—Japanese had previous experience
appropriating Chinese models, adjusting them to suit Japanese conditions as well.36)
Given the kinds of changes present in Tokugawa Japan and the paths that change fol-
lowed in Meiji, it is fair to say that contact with communities beyond Asia did not
induce novel responses so much as it catalyzed already extant domestic capabilities.
Instead of perceiving Japanese reforms as simple “Westernization”—a terribly inexact and
misleading term—it is more appropriate to recognize a strong local impulse towards a
modernity initially—but not entirely—defined elsewhere.
Significantly, that modernity included an imperialist impulse, in large part because
the prevailing global modernity entailed the creation of empire. Indeed, for Japanese,
imperialism arrived initially more as a threat than as a model.37 National security issues
were of paramount concern for the infant Meiji state. This began with anxieties over the
territorial security of the home islands, but in the face of the Occident’s final expansion-
ary drive for colonies and the withering of Chinese power and prestige, this came to
include other islands in Japan’s immediate vicinity. The successful securing of this
periphery, however, in turn resulted in the gradual widening of definitions of strategic
interests to include more distant lands. Excepting only Hideyoshi’s unsuccessful forays
into Korea—and possibly the seizure of Okinawa by Satsuma han—this kind of expan-
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sionary drive, however, is not a recurring theme in Japanese history and should be con-
sidered an act of a new era.
At the same time, the global society that Japan was joining posed not only a military
threat but a civilizational threat as well. This helps explain the popular agitation for
modernity in Meiji. It also explains the creation of a Japanese colonial modernity which,
unsurprisingly, manifested a similar pattern to the one at home: it was popular, despite
assuming foreign forms it was the product of domestic forces, and it did not unfold
smoothly.38 Violence and sharp debate were recurring themes amid the empire too.
The creation of a Japanese empire in Meiji was part and parcel of the Japanese cre-
ation of a Japanese industrial capitalist modernity. Not only did many Japanese think
that a “great power” (rekkyo¯ ??) required imperialist possessions, but the new military
necessary to defend the realm and secure colonies thought it also required expansion to
insure sufficient sources of supply and strategic high ground. Moreover, in addition to
enhancing the economic strength of the empire, the securing of foreign subjects was sim-
ilarly thought to enhance society at home, making imperialism seem good for the whole.
This is perhaps most evident in the growing popularity of Herbert Spencer and “social
Darwinism” in Meiji Japan.39 It was also apparent in the altruistic concerns of budding
imperialists, something usually presented as a version of la mission civilisatrice.40
To successfully incorporate new lands, it became necessary to develop appropriate
infrastructure. It is well known that this included a new and modern military establish-
ment,41 but usually less emphasized is the fact that the imperial project included also the
development of a modern administrative infrastructure. While Tokyo and Kyoto
Imperial Universities were founded in part to provide trained personnel for Japanese gov-
ernment and industry, Takushoku University ???? was founded in 1900 in part to
help serve the emerging empire. Beyond that, legally incorporated volunteer associations
were founded to promote interest in successful development of Japan’s new colonial
holdings.42 Eventually, new corporations emerged to help develop these lands, the best-
known being the Oriental Development Company (To¯yo¯ Takushoku Kaisha ?????
?), founded in 1908. Enterprising economic entities were also quick to find profits
either in empire or in linking it to Japan.43
Illustrative examples of how these strands of thought merged in late Meiji are usually
provided in the likes of Fukuzawa Yukichi ???? (1835-1901) and Tokutomi Soho¯ ?
??? (1863-1957). Less famous, however, was a host of government functionaries, aca-
demics, and other public figures who similarly envisioned Japan as a modern imperialist
state. One was Takahashi Sakue ???? (1867-1920), an 1894 graduate of Tokyo
Imperial University’s Faculty of Law and later a professor there.44 Writing a year prior to
the Russo-Japanese War, he argued that Japanese action in Manchuria was both a “right”
(kenri ??) and a “duty” (gimu ??). It was a right because the terms of the treaty that
ended the Sino-Japanese War entitled Japan to keep the peace in East Asia. It was a duty
because of precedent: Japan had acted previously to secure the peace in the Ryu¯kyu¯s,
Taiwan, and Korea. In Takahashi’s view, it was the Russian advance into Asia that desta-
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bilized the region, endangering even Japan. While the establishment of a Russian naval
threat in the Yellow and Japan Seas threatened Japanese command of the seas around
Japan, the Russian penetration of Manchuria constrained Japanese potential growth and
confined the Japanese to Japan. Takahashi, for one, already envisioned a Japanese role on
the Asian mainland beyond Korea. He insisted, however, that in rectifying the situation
Japan needed to act strictly in accordance with prevailing standards of international law
and precedent. For example, he concluded that future Japanese actions against Russians
in Chinese territory were legally justifiable, basing his conclusions on incidents like the
1838 Caroline Incident, in which British marines in Canada acting in self-defense
destroyed destabilizing forces in American waters.45
In the wake of the ensuing Russo-Japanese War, other Japanese sought to ameliorate
fears of Japan’s rising power by noting that Japan’s new found prowess was an example of
civilizational advancement. For example, in his analysis of Japan as a great power, Seiji
Hishida (1874-?) distinguished between Russia’s “‘policy of exclusiveness’ and her ‘tradi-
tion of irresponsible authority’” with that “of Japan, who has, on the one hand, con-
sciously adopted the Anglo-Saxon principle of national freedom and equality of opportu-
nity, but who has, on the other hand, kindred sympathies and traditional relations with
the backward nations of Asia.”46 Hishida insisted that Japan had acted not only morally
correctly, but also in accordance with international law. He further emphasized that the
growing Japanese empire would continue to identify with these modern values. Indeed,
Hishida, with a Ph.D. from Columbia University, went on to serve this empire in a
modern capacity himself (discussed below).
Proving to be a quick study, Imperial Japan’s successes were impressive—at its
wartime height the Japanese empire eventually spanned almost a fifth of the globe.
Imperial Japan had by that point taken part in four wars and a number of isolated “inci-
dents” that, with the important exception of the Manchurian Incident, were not qualita-
tively different from the actions of other imperialist powers over the previous century.
Indeed, many Japanese diplomatic and military initiatives occurred in cooperation with
other imperialist powers. Imperialist-minded Japanese demonstrated a strong predilec-
tion to follow international precedents, much as the institution of new forms of Meiji
society did.47
Of Japan’s various colonies, Manchuria proved to be of central significance to this
budding empire, and as such, it witnessed an enormous influx of Japanese. 
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THE MODERNITY OF THE MANTETSU ERA
Never were such sharp questions ask’d as this day,
Never was average man, his soul, more energetic, more like a God,
Lo, how he urges and urges, leaving the masses no rest!
His daring foot is on land and sea everywhere, he colonizes the Pacific, the archipelagoes,
With the steamship, the electric telegraph, the newspaper, the wholesale engines of war,
With these and the world-spreading factories he interlinks all geography, all lands;
Expanding the empire was one thing, but consolidating it and rendering it usable by
Japanese was another. In addition to securing military victories and international recog-
nition, Meiji authorities needed also to encourage local acceptance of Japanese rule as
well as encourage the use of the empire by Japanese civilians.48 In the wake of the Russo-
Japanese War, in Manchuria this fell to a newly created triumvirate consisting of the
Kanto¯gun, the Japanese consular service, and what was to become Japan’s largest prewar
corporation, the South Manchurian Railway Company, commonly referred to as
Mantetsu ??.49 These three organizations, however, maintained different responsibili-
ties. Before the Manchurian Incident, the Kanto¯gun controlled directly only the
Guandong Government-General (Kanto¯ So¯tokufu ?????), supervising all lands on
the Liaodong ?? Peninsula leased by Japan. Outside of these leased lands the consular
service was the chief Japanese authority—entailing its own police force—though mun-
dane affairs pertaining to the railway and its “attached lands” (fuzokuchi ???) were left
to Mantetsu. 
This tripartite arrangement was prone to interservice rivalries, and differing goals lay
the seeds for future conflict.50 As in the Japanese home islands, defining modernity in
Manchuria was subject to contending views. That said, the Japanese construction of the
modern in Manchuria before the Manchurian Incident fell chiefly to Mantetsu.
Mantetsu’s vision of modernity is evident in a variety of ways, but first consider its
leadership. The first president was Goto¯ Shimpei ???? (1857-1929), a doctor turned
official bureaucrat. Eventually promoted to a barony in the post-Restoration aristocracy,
his career paralleled that of the rising Japanese state, illustrating well the role that empire
played in the development of a modern Japan.51
Having distinguished himself through his work at the Nagoya Medical School and at
the military hospital in Osaka during the Satsuma Rebellion, Goto¯ joined the Home
Ministry’s medical bureau in 1883, eventually becoming its head. While at the ministry,
in 1890 he published his Principles of National Health (??????) and took part in
the creation of new sewage and water facilities in Tokyo. This recommended him to
Army Vice-Minister Kodama Gentaro¯ ????? (1852-1906), who made Goto¯ chief of
the Army Quarantine Office looking after the return of more than 230,000 soldiers from
the Sino-Japanese War (1895-95). After the war, Goto¯ returned to the Home Ministry,
but remained involved in overseas affairs, advising the new Japanese administration on
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Taiwan about health issues. In 1896,
Kodama, now governor-general of Taiwan,
asked Goto¯ to join him there, eventually
making Goto¯ the first civilian governor of
the island in 1898.
After Goto¯’s term as first president
of Mantetsu expired in 1908, he returned
to Japan where he not only later served as
Foreign Minister and mayor of Tokyo, but
also founded the Institute of Municipal
Research (Toshi Kenkyu¯ Kai ?????) in
1917, an organization he supervised until
his death. This institution published the
influential Toshi Ko¯ron ????, a journal
that published articles on urban planning
by Japan’s premier academics and bureau-
crats and served as a pulpit from which
Goto¯ continued to press for a modern
Japan. That Goto¯’s efforts were multi-
faceted is demonstrated by his helping to
found the Boy Scouts of Japan as well as his
forging links with like-minded individuals elsewhere, such as the American revisionist
historian and political commentator Charles A. Beard (1874-1948).52 Goto¯ could have
described himself as a progressive modernist, and his colonial experiences provided him
with practical experience useful to effecting change in Japan itself.
As president of Mantetsu, Goto¯ tried to encourage Chinese acknowledgment of
Japanese rule by applying what he called “biological principles” (seibutsugaku no genri ?
?????) of imperialism, a policy aimed at inducing Chinese acceptance through
encouraging economic development and acknowledging local customs of self-rule.53 At
the same time, however, Goto¯ worked closely with the military. He had no qualms, for
example, about using military force to terminate Taiwanese resistance.54 Indeed, it was
likely because Goto¯ could work with the military that he received official positions.55
The main arena exhibiting Mantetsu’s activities under Goto¯ was the string of new
cities that the company built alongside its newly acquired railway. Inspired in part by
Russian constructions in Dalian ?? (Jp. Dairen, Russian Dal’ny), Goto¯ wanted to show
the world what Japanese were capable of building.56 From its inception, Mantetsu was
more than just a railway company—though ostensibly modeled on quasi-imperial
European corporations, Mantetsu included much more.57 Much academic attention, for
example, has been paid to Mantetsu’s Economic Research Bureau, a corporate research
organization that examined in detail a wide range of issues going far beyond the needs of
the railway. Its publications included historical, social, and cultural topics as well.58
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Figure 1. Goto¯ Shimpei. Source: Mantetsu
1937a.
Chief among Mantetsu’s cities was the
port of Dalian. The heart of the Guandong
leased territories, this city oversaw much of
the Japanese presence in Manchuria. As a
transportation hub it connected the riches
of inland Manchuria with markets overseas,
and as an administrative hub it exhibited
the rapid growth of governmental, academ-
ic, hospital, and other infrastructure.60
Headquarters for many Japanese corpora-
tions and institutions in Manchuria could
be found in Dalian, including construction
as well as commercial firms. One of the ear-
liest was Okada Engineering (?????), a
firm that, employing recent graduates of
Tokyo University, helped reshape the south-
ern Manchurian landscape to suit the tastes
of Japanese empire builders. Some in this
firm had connections with Tatsuno Kingo
???? (1854-1919), the architect of
Tokyo Station (1914) and other famous
Meiji architectural landmarks.61 Connec-
tions like that, along with others made through the Association of Japanese Architects
(Nihon Kenchiku Gakkai ??????)62 or through the new Journal of Manchurian
Architecture (Manshu¯ kenchiku zasshi ??????),63 helped insure that a particular
architectural style—that popularized by Tatsuno, sometimes called the “Tatsuno style”
(???)—initially became the standard throughout Japanese Manchuria. This involved
a somewhat grand interpretation of
the style of historical eclecticism
that was popular in contemporary
Europe. Eventually other styles
gained popularity, such as Japanese
expressions of art nouveau and what
later emerged as the international
style. Reflecting developments not
only in Japan but also in Europe
and in Europe’s colonies, Japanese
expressions of the built environment
in Manchuria part of a global dis-
course.64
Eager to build treaty-ports further
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Figure 2. One of the more enduring symbols
of the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-
century global modernity, images of
Mantetsu’s newest locomotives abounded in
publications of Manchuria. Source: Mantetsu
1937a.59
Figure 3. Shenyang Station. Source: Mantetsu 1930,
p. 46.
inland, and seeking to entice
Japanese immigration and
entrepreneurs there, Mantetsu
supervised a frenzy of construc-
tion, with planners envisioning
five types of new urban cen-
ters.65 This occurred mainly in
the “attached lands” that
appeared near Chinese cities—
the largest of which were adja-
cent Shenyang ??,66 Liaoyang
??, and Changchun ??. These
three cities were not, however,
the only urban locales in which
the Japanese were interested, as an official Mantetsu history later noted that while the
Japanese initially identified fifteen former Russian towns as places to develop “cultural
cities” (bunmeiteki toshi ?????), Japanese eventually designed plans for one hundred
and forty.67
Nor were these locales the only venues demonstrating new built environments.
Between Mantetsu’s new towns and the already extant Chinese cities, new “mercantile
districts” (sho¯fuchi ???) appeared. Here could be found Chinese creations of the
modern, some inspired by Japanese creations and some competing with Japanese con-
cerns.68
Designing Mantetsu’s cities often entailed specific goals. While the Mantetsu town at
Shenyang, the largest outside Dalian, became an industrial and commercial center,
Fushun ?? developed as a coal mining center and nearby Anshan ?? became an iron
and steel manufacturing center. Seven hundred kilometers north of Dalian lay
Mantetsu’s northernmost city at
Changchun, a city dedicated to
the collection of soybeans from
central Manchuria—so much so
that some nicknamed it the
“Bean Capital” (mame no miyako
???).69
Nor was the economic
exploitation of Manchuria lim-
ited to these industries.
Mantetsu encouraged an array
of economic endeavors, includ-
ing the development of such
light industries  such as soybean
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Figure 4. Shenyang’s Yamato Hotel. Source: Mantetsu
1937a.
Figure 5. Dalian’s Central Research Laboratory (????
????). Source: Mantetsu 1937a.




the making of beet sugar. In
the agricultural sector,
Mantetsu established experi-
mental farms to foster new
crops, livestock, and tech-
nologies. Mantetsu also pro-
vided new kinds of mulberry
trees to enhance sericulture.
Other Mantetsu endeavors
aimed at expanding the
exploitation of Manchuria’s forests, fisheries, and ores, such as gold. 
Mantetsu also operated ports, shipping lines, warehouses, and telegraphic communi-
cations. In some ways Mantetsu’s activities were reminiscent of the opening of the
American West—the railway lay track, established cities, and promoted the capacity to
make profits. The scale of operations, however, was vastly different, and, more impor-
tantly, run by what in effect were Japanese civil servants, Mantetsu appeared to be play-
ing an almost national role—or, more correctly, a modernizing national role.70
Mantetsu’s new cities, for example, were laid out according to modern principles of
urban planning. For example, the Shenyang and Changchun towns were designed by
1894 Tokyo University civil engineering graduate Kato¯ Yonokichi ????? (1867-?),
who thought rectangular city shapes and a grid pattern for streets typified modern urban
planning.71 Kato¯ also implemented rudimentary zoning laws—something that did not
appear in Japan until 1919. Mantetsu went on to provide appropriate physical infra-
structure, including hospitals, schools, libraries, and auditoriums. Roads were paved with
macadam, electrical grids were installed,72 and professionally-designed parks and other
recreational space appeared. For example, Changchun’s West Park (???) was designed
by a Tokyo University professor Shirasawa Yasumi ???? (1868-1947). It offered
space for athletics, boats, flower beds, a small zoo, a merry-go-round, and other chil-
dren’s amusements.73
Mantetsu’s architects also developed new kinds of home construction. As a result,
Japanese-built housing in Manchuria represented a new way of living, reorganizing as
they did patterns of daily life. Architects could even be found boasting of their abilities.
One contributor to the Journal of Manchurian Architecture suggested that architects too
could function as progressively crusading civil servants.74 Others, however, concerned
that Manchuria needed a gentler guiding hand, insisted on the need for continued com-
promise in the creation of a culture of the future.75
Mantetsu’s cities represented civilizational development, offering solutions to prob-
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Figure 6. Agricultural Experimental Station at Gongzhuling
(????????).  Source: South Manchuria Railway,
1929.
lems apparent both in
Manchuria and in the Japan-
ese home islands. Mantetsu
publicists never ceased to
extol the virtues of these
cities—not only in Japanese76
but in English.77 The best-
known of these publications
is perhaps the Mantetsu
series Reports on Progress.
One of the chief compilers
was the above-mentioned
Seiji Hishida, who, between
penning his 1905 volume
and coming to work for
Mantetsu, had worked for the Korean Government-General, helping compile The
Annual Report on Reform and Progress in Korea between 1907 and 1917. Yet while the
tone of the Reports on Progress was confident, other publications were downright exuber-
ant. One observer went so far as to suggest that under Japanese guidance, Manchuria
seemed finally to have entered modern history.78 Kanto¯gun observers agreed.79
One is tempted to dismiss writing like this as simple propaganda, but at the same
time one cannot help but read such works as also expressing genuine hopes. Concrete
progress was apparent—even some foreigners approved of Japanese activities. The British
consul in Dalian, for example, noted in 1924 that “[f ]oreign residents and travelers here
agree that Dairen is a very well run city and compares favorably with towns of a similar
size in Japan and even elsewhere.”80
Beyond the creation of physical infrastructure, other activities could be interpreted as
modern. In addition to economic development there was also the growth of an educa-
tional system, including universities in Dalian and Shenyang. Mantetsu also made a con-
certed effort to spread modern notions of sanitation and hygiene. Mantetsu’s new hospi-
tals and clinics began vaccinating people within the railway cities, and later included
some outside as well.81 Japanese also took measures to contain epidemics. Perhaps the
first time was during the cholera epidemic that broke out in Dalian and Yingkou in
1909. Other epidemics ensued, in part because of the ease of railway transport, but the
railway cities played important roles in trying to combat their spread through quaran-
tines and inspections.82 On a more mundane basis, Mantetsu officials began to ensure
basic levels of sanitation in their cities by inspecting horse-carts, having garbage removed,
sprinkling water on streets to keep dust down, and inspecting water purity.83
Yet another kind of modern activity practiced in the Mantetsu railway towns involved
leisure pursuits. For example, Mantetsu promoted Japanese tourism as a means of dis-
playing the company’s many accomplishments, as well as increasing profits.84 Tickets on
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Figure 7. Changchun’s West Park. Source: Mantetsu 1937a.
sale at Tokyo Station could
take travelers to any station
in Manchuria. Moreover, in
addition to new parks, also
featured public halls that
included facilities for chess,
billiards, and lectures as well
as a cafeteria. Public enter-
tainment could be found in
theaters and auditoriums.
Mantetsu also provided facil-
ities for sports, especially
baseball and tennis. Eventually, baseball teams and sumo wrestlers from Japan toured
Manchuria, and Manchurian teams competed in Japan. These tours could be followed in
any of the various newspapers in Manchuria, the most important of which was the
Manshu¯ Nichi Nichi Shinbun ??????. Records of the meetings of other kinds of
clubs, ranging from brass bands to hiking groups—also encouraged by Mantetsu—were
posted in these papers. 
Clearly, Mantetsu was more than simply a railway company—it and its associated
organizations endeavored to foster the growth of a modern society in its enclaves. At the
same time, Manchurian experiences proved useful elsewhere. Goto¯ and his disciples, hav-
ing gained valuable experience in Manchuria, returned to Japan to apply their lessons
there, and modern cities played a key role in that effort. Goto¯ himself declared that the
mission of urban planners was to help usher in a “new age in urban life” by providing
new solutions for new problems.85 Kato¯ Yonokichi, Mantetsu’s busy urban planner, like-
wise was able to use his Manchurian experience at least once with regard to Korea.86
Mantetsu went about its colonial projects in Manchuria in a consciously modern
fashion, one that expressed a Japanese colonial modernity that had much in common
with other colonial powers. Yet while they modeled their efforts on those of Europeans
and North Americans, Japanese sought to improve upon those models and make them
relevant for specific conditions within the Japanese empire. This is perhaps most evident
in Mantetsu’s town-building project—no other imperialist power embarked on such a
campaign.
Representing an imperialist Japanese state acting in a progressive, benevolent fashion,
Mantetsu acted in some ways as an overseas extension of Japan’s limited and paternal
“imperial democracy.”87 As such, the modernity of this era became not just a broadly
shared goal aimed at enticing the support of colonized subjects and building a strong
Japan, but a cultural orientation that was widely embraced with enthusiasm, including
many outside Mantetsu.
Despite this dedication, however, their creation was inherently uncertain. Probably
most well known of the problems Japanese in Manchuria faced were those associated
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Figure 8. Combating the plague in north Manchuria. Source:
Mantetsu 1937a.
with the rise of Chinese nationalism, especially after the 1926-28 Northern Expedition
of the Chinese Nationalist Party (Guomindang, better known in the Wade-Giles roman-
ization as the Kuomintang ???). Chiefly, these involved boycotts of Japanese goods
and services, rival railway schemes, the assertion of Chinese taxation rights, and threats
to unilaterally abolish extraterritoriality. Less well known, however, were a variety of oth-
er anxieties. Banditry was endemic, including piracy along the coast. Communism
seemed to be spreading, especially among Koreans in Manchuria who often preferred
Chinese to Japanese citizenship, even if the Japanese government forbade it. A resurgent
Soviet Union was thought to be involved in a host of disquieting activities, including
promoting communism and smuggling arms to Manchurian communists. Worse for
Japanese entrepreneurs, the Soviets also suddenly seemed less inclined to allow fishing
rights to Japanese in the waters around Sakhalin than they had formerly been, while at
the same time becoming more interested in reasserting control over northern Manchuria.
This was evident not only in economic development schemes but also through the use of
force, as the short conflict between Soviet forces and the army of Zhang Xueliang ???
(1898-2001) demonstrated in the fall of 1929.88 The downfall of Nikolai Bukharin
(1888-1938) in 1928 and the subsequent collapse of the New Economic Policy must
also have played upon the minds of Japan’s USSR-watchers. Until then, Japanese partici-
pation in the development of Siberia still seemed a possibility.
At the same time, it did not seem to many Japanese that the current system was capa-
ble of dealing with these challenges. Shockwaves from the run on the Bank of Taiwan in
1927 that sparked a panic in Japan reverberated also in Manchuria. And if the banking
system seemed in jeopardy, Manchuria’s main economic engine was also in the news, as
Mantetsu proved susceptible to a number of scandals that tarnished its reputation.
Moreover, neither Mantetsu nor the Japanese consular police seemed able to safeguard
Japanese citizens in the summer of 1931, when a Japanese officer was executed by
Chinese soldiers, and Korean farmers south of Changchun became the targets of Chinese
vigilantes at Wanbaoshan ???. Anti-Korean (and by implication anti-Japanese) riots
quickly spread to Heilongjiang (Heilungkiang ???), but these were not the first
instances of such violence—Chinese-Korean feuding had occurred several years earlier in
Andong (Antung ??). Even Yoshida Shigeru ??? (1878-1967), the consul-general in
Shenyang between 1925 and 1928 and not a supporter of radical military intervention,
had gone so far as to advocate expanding Japanese authority in Manchuria in order to
secure investments and stabilize society.89 Yet the foreign ministry was itself hamstrung.
Not only did it tangle publicly with other ministries and outspoken activists over defin-
ing Japan’s security, but within its own ranks were some who supported rival, radical
alternatives.90
Nor did it help that the popular press derided Japanese diplomats (and some in the
military) for preferring postings to Europe over China, or that they reinforced a sense of
urgency through constant reminders that the Russo-Japanese War had cost Japan
100,000 men and two billion yen.91 Still, despite these tribulations, the Japanese presence
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in Manchuria continued to expand. This is evident in growing migration, the establish-
ment of air routes, and continued Japanese investments. Japanese Manchuria was thriv-
ing, even  while it was seemingly imperiled.92
More forceful instances of Japanese policy in Manchuria attempting to deal with
these issues before September 1931 were a matter of record. Several of the “twenty-one
demands” the Japanese government made of China in 1915 concerned Manchuria.93
Secret military activities to secure Japanese primacy in Manchuria were also longstand-
ing.94 Several of these were carried out without any sanction by the Japanese government,
such as the assassination of Zhang Zuolin ??? (1875-1928). Given the growing popu-
larity of radical sentiments in Japan itself, perhaps we should not be too surprised that
the Japanese military in Manchuria would react in some way to these developments on
their own initiative.
It is important to note, however, that overthrowing the Mantetsu order had some
degree of popular support, not only in Japan, as Young has noted, but also in Manchuria.
The most well-known activist group there was the Manchurian Youth League (????
??), founded in 1928 to encourage the expansion of the Japanese presence.
British diplomatic observers reinforce this perspective. As early as 1928 observers in
Beiping ?? and Mukden reported that tensions over railways might some day result in
some drastic event.95 Indeed, the Mukden consul-general reasoned then that given
Japanese concerns, the Japanese might find it necessary to some day occupy Manchurian
territory.96
Given the wealth of problems apparent in the Mantetsu era, it is reasonable to
assume that many Japanese may well have preferred a wholesale change. This is not to
say, however, that the men who carried out the Manchurian Incident anticipated exactly
what was to follow. Yet the nature and extent of the problems apparent in Manchuria
seems to have encouraged that more extreme measures would eventually be championed.
A sense of crisis, perhaps akin to what Japanese experienced in the years preceding the
Meiji Restoration, assured that a broadly shared cultural response would eventually fol-
low.
By the fall of 1931, many Japanese in Manchuria were ready for something new.
What was more, given the failings of the Chinese warlord regime, some Chinese were
also inclined to accept something new, potential allies in the creation of a new order.97
MANCHUKUO’S MODERNITY
What whispers are these O lands, running ahead of you, passing under the seas? 
Are all nations communing? is there going to be but one heart to the globe? 
Is humanity forming en-masse? for lo, tyrants tremble, crowns grow dim, 
The earth, restive, confronts a new era, perhaps a general divine war, 
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No one knows what will happen next, such portents fill the days and nights;
The puppet state (kairai kokka ????) of Manchukuo was neither a simple colony
nor the fiefdom of an adventurist military. It was a much larger experiment, one
attempting to solve not only the issue of Japanese control of Manchuria but also those
issues stemming from the perceived need to transform Japan into a more fully industrial
state, one capable of waging total war. To do this, Manchukuo’s planners embraced a
new kind of modernity. 
Little of this modernity, however, proved actually to be brand new, as many of its
chief components had been part of the Japanese intellectual landscape for some time. In
this way, Manchukuo’s administrators could assume there would be some popularity in
Japan for their designs for a new society. Indeed, Manchukuo’s new facades may well
have been designed more with the Japanese public in mind than the “Manchukuoan.” In
this light, Manchukuo becomes the vanguard of a so-called “Sho¯wa Restoration,” a
movement aimed ultimately at renovating Japanese society at home. The numbers and
ranks of bureaucrats that subsequently migrated to Manchukuo—and eventually
returned to help renovate Japan—demonstrate that it was no sideshow.98
Perhaps the most obvious statement of Manchukuo’s modernity was its administra-
tive form. No longer was it possible to simply conquer and annex a foreign land—the
Kanto¯gun had to resort to the fig leaf of a nation-state. The army therefore, attempting
to go beyond the forms of imperialism already in use, appealed to the last Manchu
emperor Puyi ?? (1906-1967), first as regent, later as emperor.99
The Kanto¯gun supported this national fiction with modern concepts. One was “pan-
Asianism,” a vision that attempted to eclipse traditionally mono-ethnic nation states.
However, while Manchukuo’s specific slogans of Asian unity—such as “ethnic harmony”
(minzoku kyo¯wa????)—were new, the underlying concepts were not. The concept of
a pan-Asian brotherhood united to fend off imperialist Occidentals had long been a pop-
ular theme in Japanese—and probably all Asian—societies. However, for many Japanese
pan-Asianists, this meant Japanese leadership of their fellow Asians.100 Those committed
to developing a new society in Manchukuo took this for granted.
As the concern for pan-Asianism suggests, the goals of Manchukuo’s planners differed
qualitatively from those who administered Manchuria in the previous era. While the
Mantetsu era defined modernity almost materialistically—doubtless assuming that from
material changes would emerge modern mentalities—Manchukuo authorities focused on
morality, at least superficially. Manchukuo’s basic ideological principle was the “kingly
way” (o¯d o¯ ??), a concept that supposedly reinvigorated Chinese tradition by making it
more appropriate for a modern nation state. In this way the culture of Manchukuo was
to surpass that of the Mantetsu era because it created an improved kind of national sub-
ject, one supposedly less beholden to the capitalist West and more in tune with Asian
societies and traditions. In keeping with this slogan, the new state paid great attention to
the development of schools and appropriate curricula. Of course, much of this new cul-
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ture was never clearly expressed, and even its vague generalities turned out usually to be
contradictory, if not hypocritical.101 However, the rhetoric resonated well within Japanese
communities, both in Manchuria and in Japan, and much ink was spilt on the subject by
academics and in the popular press.
Other concepts important for Manchukuo’s revised modernity involved the role of
the state. Preparing for war with the Soviet Union, the Manchukuoan economy was run
in a quasi-Soviet manner, by state planning. This the Kanto¯gun felt was the best means
of turning a predominantly rural economy into a modern, industrial one. In the wake of
the Great Depression and the apparently rapid industrialization of the USSR, this
seemed to make sense.102 Japan’s “technology bureaucrats” in turn leapt on board to help
create a newly modern infrastructure.103
Political developments mirrored the economic. In the era of a growing enthusiasm for
fascism, it made sense to organize the body politic accordingly, and Manchukuo assumed
the structure of a one-party state.104 At the time this was hailed as progress, and even if
many of these endeavors later proved unworkable, Manchukuo initially served as the
blueprint for later additions to the
Japanese empire—such as the
Philippines—as well as for later
changes in Japan itself.
Much of Manchukuo’s moderni-
ty was evident in its new capital,
Xinjing (also Hsinking ??; Shin-
kyo¯ in Japanese), designed around
the railway town and Chinese city at
Changchun. Indeed, its very
name—“New Capital”—connoted
modernity. This was not to be a cap-
ital named for its location like
Beijing ?? ,  Nanjing ?? ,  or
Tokyo ??, or simply by its role as a
capital like Kyo¯to ??. Manchu-
kuo’s capital was to be a modern
capital, one with plazas, parks, pub-
lic transportation, and the other
amenities commonly found in a
modern urban setting. At the same
time, Xinjing’s built environment
also contrasted with Mantetsu’s
cities. Instead of compact, well-inte-
grated railway towns, the puppet
capital offered a sprawling layout
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Figure 9. Map of Xinjing. Source: Ho¯ten Tetsudo¯
Kyoku 1939.
that generated grand vistas of monumental buildings. The style of the official buildings
was similarly grandiose, as Japanese architects attempted to endow the new capital—and
thus, the new state—with a distinctive facade, one that capped modern buildings with
Asian rooflines. In doing so, the architects of the Capital Construction Bureau (Kokuto
Kensetsu Kyoku ?????) sought to display architecturally the goals and values of the
new state. Indeed, following in the footsteps of Goto¯ Shimpei, they sought to lead
Manchurian society in new directions through alterations to the built environment.105
In keeping with the city’s
new role as national capital,
the Capital Construction
Bureau created national
monuments to serve as fora
for mass rallies and national-
ly significant events. Just
north of the new palace
designed for Puyi stood the
five-story-tall Chu¯reito¯ ??
?, one of nine memorials
scattered around the coun-
try dedicated to those who
perished in the Manchurian
Incident. The Monument
to National Foundation ?
??, built in 1940, sat at
the south end of the city
near the new academic
quarter. Here, in a some-
what heavy style that blend-
ed elements of Chinese
architecture south of the
Great Wall with Japanese
and the official Manchukuo
style, Puyi reported
Japanese military victories
and prayed for the security
of the new empire.106
Much of what was deemed
modern in Manchukuo’s new
capital, however, originated in the Mantetsu era. The electrical grid continued to expand,
and new technologies, such as a wireless communications center and an airport, were
incorporated into the city plan. New centers of recreation appeared, including a golf
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Figure 10. Manchukuo’s Hall of State (1936). Photo by
author.
Figure 11. Supreme Court of Manchukuo (1938).
Photo by author.
course, a horse-race track, and an enormous
green belt encircling the city. To expand the
city’s economic base, light industry was also
promoted, but was limited to the northeast
corner of the city to insure that airborne pol-
lution would be carried away from the city’s
center. All of these alterations reflected con-
cerns apparent before the Manchurian
Incident—but the sudden Japanese preoccu-
pation with the city compelled their creation
at this particular point in time, demonstrating
that the capital’s designers sought to make the
city the most advanced it could be.
The public discourse surrounding Manchukuo
at times also seemed rooted in the Mantetsu
era. Harvard graduate Komatsu Takashi ??
? (1886-1965), for example, initially defend-
ed the seizure of Manchuria by suggesting
that Japanese actions were taken in self-
defense, in reaction to growing Chinese radi-
calism. In this way Japanese sought “to bring
order out of chaos.” This was logical he felt,
because Japan’s “fundamental policy [in Manchuria] from the outset has been to advance
economic development.” Thus, Mantetsu had done more than modernize Manchuria’s
communications infrastructure:
We cannot help but look upon Manchuria of today with a deep feeling of satisfac-
tion. In the course of a quarter century what was no more than a war-worn wilder-
ness has been turned into one of the richest districts of China....Perhaps the most
important service of this nature is the building of model cities at Mukden
(Shenyang), Changchun, Antung (Andong), and many other important centers.107
Indeed, most, if not all, discussions in English like Komatsu’s tended to emphasize
the creation of a modern state in Manchukuo more than any discussion of the “kingly
way.”108 As Komatsu was no radical militarist (see below), it is important to note that a
continuing elaboration of Mantetsu’s legacy helped galvanize published support for the
puppet state beyond the military and its backers. This too was evident in the built envi-
ronment of Xinjing, witnessing as it did the expanded construction of hospitals, libraries,
sports facilities, and universities. The bulk of this construction, however, continued in
more internationally attuned styles rather than in any re-energized Asian style. This was
evident in such prominent buildings as the head office of the new state bank and the res-
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Figure 12. Chu¯reito¯ (1934). Source: post-
card held at Nichibunken Library.
idence for the Kanto¯gun
commandant.
Other changes in the
built environment spoke to
a wider audience. While real
estate brokers were not per-
mitted in the new capital—
to help prevent the ravages
of unrestrained capitalism—
unsightly power lines and
other cables were buried, to
help prevent the clutter
apparent in many modern
cities. There was also a
renewed push for modern
housing, one more appro-
priate for a national capital
than Mantetsu’s dormito-
ries. This included not only
new apartments, but also
rows of new single-family
homes. Beyond the capital,
new villages laid out accord-
ing to modernist principles
also began to appear, vil-
lages that, if built to their
logical conclusion, would
expand to cover the whole
of Manchuria in an inter-
locking and mutually rein-
forcing pattern of agrarian
militia cooperatives.109
Other Mantetsu era tre-
nds apparent in the built
environment were similarly
elaborated upon. Public
parks, first introduced to
Manchuria by Mantetsu,
became one of the new capi-
tal’s most noted features.
Xinjing provided enough
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Figure 13. Bank of Manchukuo. Photo by author.
Figure 14. Kanto¯gun Commandant’s Residence. Photo by
author.
Figure 15. New housing in Shinkyo¯. Source: Mantetsu
1937a.
land to assure a ratio of 450 people per hectare of urban green space. This was thought
to be about the same as North American cities yet three to four times more than
European cities and ten times better than Kyoto.110 Transportation infrastructure similar-
ly expanded. New roads and railways more closely integrated the capital with the rest of
the country, and officials planned a more comprehensive network to integrate the entire
country.111 Links to Japan also increased, promoting the further development of
Manchuria’s small tourism industry.112
Discussions of what this signified are enlightening. Aiga Kensuke ???? (1879-?),
a Mantetsu employee who became the Capital Construction Bureau’s first chief architect,
suggested that Manchukuo’s development was a marvel that could serve as a model for
the Chinese Republic.113 A commentator in the Journal of Manchurian Architecture sug-
gested that Xinjing, serving as a “modern, idealistic city” (gendai riso¯teki no toshi????
????) was helping to renovate not only architectural forms but civilization itself.114
Tokyo University engineering professor Kishida Hideto¯ ????? (1899-1966) agreed.
To him it seemed that Japanese military and state-building activities in Manchuria were
restarting Asian history.115
As with the comments made by Mantetsu officials before the Manchurian Incident,
on one level these kinds of comments—and there were many of this sort—can be read
simply as propaganda. Yet on another they indicate a general agreement on what
Manchukuo, and by implication Japan, needed in order to deal with the various prob-
lems society confronted. As such these comments dovetail with reformist sentiments in
Japan and indicate the emergence of a new cultural orientation.116
Not all Japanese, however, were in complete agreement. Seiji Hishida, the chronicler
of progress in Japan’s empire, wrote in 1940 that Japan’s “responsibility” in East Asia con-
sisted simply in keeping the peace between Chinese, Russians, and Japanese and in fur-
thering regional economic development. His defense of Japanese actions after the Marco
Polo Bridge Incident (7 July 1937) betrays Mantetsu rather than Manchukuo sensibili-
ties.117 The view of Ito¯ Takeo ???? (1895-1984), one of a group of Mantetsu
researchers arrested between September 1942 and June 1943, was more ambiguous. A
product of the Taisho¯ era, Ito¯ genuinely wanted to aid China, yet it seemed to him that
the enhanced powers Mantetsu’s research bureau gained in the wake of the Manchurian
Incident initially brought the agency closer to what Goto¯ Shimpei had originally intend-
ed. That said, Ito¯ deemed the military’s later suppression of their activities as a “fascist
assault and repression by the military of our scientific work.”118 While Ito¯ enjoyed having
enhanced authority to carry out research, he did not agree with the more authoritarian
style of government.
These divergent views suggest that the specific culture of modernity Manchukuo
sought to promote was troubled, perhaps fatally so. Many of the problems of the
Mantetsu era remained, as did many of the features of that era. Moreover, sports, the cin-
ema, and other such aspects of daily life continued, suggesting that Manchukuoan life
was only partly revolutionary. Indeed, Manchukuo’s revolutionary promise often proved
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only to be only a blustery facade, leaving one to wonder how deeply revolutionary senti-
ments were actually spread throughout the Japanese population in Manchuria, not to
mention the Chinese. Indeed, the Japanese courting of Chinese elites is instructive.
Many Chinese in Manchuria apparently were willing to give the Japanese a chance after
1931, especially after the Chinese Nationalist government in Nanjing acquiesced in the
Japanese occupation of Manchuria. Japanese approaches to the Chinese community,
however, were ad hoc and sporadic, suggesting that Manchukuo’s modernity was forced
and inauthentic.119
Beyond that, elements of Manchukuo’s modernity proved simply not to be real. In
particular, the vision of Asian solidarity proved largely fictitious, at least from the per-
spective of non-Japanese. Japanese not only controlled all of the state apparatus, but in
the process they also treated other Asians terribly. Ethnic Koreans, for example—official-
ly designated even before the Manchurian Incident as “external” Japanese (gaichijin ??
?), as opposed to ethnic Japanese from the Japanese archipelago who were defined as
“internal” (naichijin ???) despite the equality implied by the 1910 Treaty of
Annexation—were targeted repeatedly, on the suspicion that they were harboring anti-
Japanese activists from the peninsula.120 Chinese, however, suffered more, most notori-
ously from the activities of Unit 731, based in Harbin, and of Unit 100, based in the
new capital.121 These units practiced bacteriological and other experiments upon count-
less unsuspecting Chinese, either those summarily rounded up and sent to their laborato-
ries or those still in their villages when these units experimented with delivery systems in
the field.122
Evidence of horrific activities elsewhere in the empire suggests that the mobilization
of science in the name of war, however gruesome, was part and parcel of Japan’s prewar
modernity at large.123 Displaying a considered application of science and technology to
meet immediate needs, such ghastly deeds might be considered part of the puppet-
state’s—and perhaps wartime Japan’s—modernity. Vastly inferior numerically to Chinese
and technologically inferior to Soviet and American military power, some Japanese
resorted to whatever means they could to protect their economic and emotional invest-
ments on the continent.124
Alternatively, perhaps numerical and technological inferiority alone do not explain
such appalling activities. Perhaps the pursuit of modernity itself, reconfiguring the very
bases of society as it proceeds, facilitates the creation of horrors, and the more radical the
restructuring, the greater potential for depravity.125 Even though the Mantetsu era wit-
nessed its own dreadful aspects—namely racial hierarchy and assimilation—
Manchukuo’s ills far exceeded those of the earlier era. 
Ignoring these cruelties, propagandists attempted to sell Manchukuo to Japanese at
home as a modern state, one to which ordinary Japanese should be proud to contribute.
And for many Japanese, at a distance, Manchukuo’s modernity seemed to ring true.126
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THE SIGNIFICANCE OF MANCHURIAN MODERNITIES
Years prophetical! the space ahead as I walk, as I vainly try to pierce it, is full of  phantoms,
Unborn deeds, things soon to be, project their shapes around me,
This incredible rush and heat, this strange ecstatic fever of dreams O years!
Your dreams O years, how they penetrate through me! (I know not whether I 
sleep or wake;)
The perform’d America and Europe grow dim, retiring in shadow behind me,
The unperform’d, more gigantic than ever, advance, advance upon me.
This essay has focused on two cultures of modernity, cultures that can perhaps be
characterized best as state- or official-inspired, even if they were to varying degrees popu-
larly supported. Other novel enterprises, however, also appeared in Manchuria, such as
those envisioned by Japan’s new religions. While Tenrikyo¯ ??? missionaries may have
been the most active, Deguchi Onisaburo¯ ?????? (1871-1948), accompanied by
Russo-Japanese War veteran (and later founder of Aikido¯ ???) Ueshiba Morihei ??
?? (1883-1969), attempted to found an ideal religious community for O¯motokyo¯ ??
? in 1924.127 Even if they  did not agree with officially sanctioned visions, they did rep-
resent communities of shared goals and values seeking to build new kinds of societies.
Perhaps they too qualify as vying cultures.
Manchuria’s two major forms of modernity are of enduring significance for contem-
porary Japan. This is evident in the wealth of publications concerning Manchuria that
have appeared since the normalization of ties with the People’s Republic of China. While
many such publications initially focused on contemporary conditions in China under
Mao, it wasn’t long before a host of others began to offer reminiscences of Japan’s former
empire.128 Some even discussed the darker aspects of the experience of Manchukuo.129
The reasons for this significance are usually understood to involve Japanese invest-
ment in and migration to Manchuria, as well as the prolonged and intense public atten-
tion given to Manchuria at home. Other reasons, however, are evident. Manchuria’s role
as a laboratory, for example, is difficult to underestimate. Not only was Mantetsu an
experimental vehicle for Japanese colonial development, but Manchukuo became a mod-
el for later additions to the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere as well as for wartime
reforms at home. Moreover, as many of these activities seemed modern and progressive,
it has proved difficult for many Japanese to disavow entirely those efforts in the postwar
world. Indeed, some postwar writers have pointed to prewar Japanese accomplishments
in Manchuria with pride.130
Moreover, much of Japan’s wartime leadership proved able to continue in power,
eventually laying the groundwork for key components of Japan’s postwar economic
recovery.131 This was most famously the case with politicians like Kishi Nobusuke
(Shinsuke) ??? (1896-1987) and Yoshino Shinji ???? (1888-1971), but the less
famous were also influential. Consider the postwar creation of the Shinkansen, or “bullet
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train.” Its father was one-time Mantetsu employee Sogo¯ Shinji ???? (1884-1981).
Another example involves academia—some of the remaining members of Mantetsu’s
Economic Research Bureau went on to found the Institute of Developing Economies, an
independent research organization still in existence today.
Another good example is Komatsu Takashi, an official at To¯yo¯ Kisen ???? and
the Asano Shipyard ???? before the war, and at Japan Steel Tube (Nippon Ko¯kan ?
???) afterwards. He was more than simply a businessman—he attended the
Washington Naval Conference and published a defense of the seizure of Manchuria (cit-
ed above). Despite this past, he participated in the demobilization of postwar Japan and
became president of the Japan-America Society (Nichibei Kyo¯kai ????), having
helped reinstate Japan Rotary International without having to purge any of its prewar
leadership.132 Despite participation on the margins of empire, individuals such as
Komatsu proved able to reinvent themselves and remain in public life. In the process
they helped reinvent Japan, creating yet another, new culture of modernity.
It is an intriguing modernity, because constrained by the rejection of many of the
more usual forms of national symbolism, Japan’s postwar national identity often seems to
focus inordinately on the creation of an explicitly modern society. Perhaps this helps
explain the particular way in which postwar Japanese have viewed places like Manchuria.
In contrast, places like Manchuria. In contrast, for Chinese and Koreans, accepting pre-
war Japanese activities as modern is anathema. For them, postwar national identities have
tended to involve defining a Japanese “other” depicted by the worst incidents attributable
to Japanese.
This suggests that to get around current international dilemmas, not only Japanese
but also Chinese and Koreans would do well to reconsider recent history in a way that
includes more nuanced definitions of the modern. Japanese, of course, need to acknowl-
edge more genuinely the cruelties that stemmed from their pursuits of the modern. At
the same time, it should be conceded that not only did many Asians collaborate with the
Japanese,133 but important aspects of contemporary Chinese and Korean society are in
part derived from Japanese colonial initiatives.
This essay has suggested that the concept of modernity is relevant—if not indispens-
able—for the study of the prewar Japanese empire. This is because modernity itself is a
cultural construct subject to debate and modification, and the evolution of this set of
perceptions reflects broad social change. Moreover, in places like former imperialist pos-
sessions, administrators had unfettered—or perhaps less hampered—political power as
well as less critical public attention, rendering it easier to go about creating modernity. In
turn, this makes the colonial setting more conducive to the historian to study modernity.
Indeed, since colonial modernities eventually had significant impact in their associated
metropoles, their significance is far from peripheral, which means that these kinds of
studies are likely to proliferate.
Despite the growing interest in modernity, colonial modernity, and postmodernity,
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however, a certain tension is evident, a tension that centers on the problem of definition.
Postmodernists do not define modernity in the ways that historians interested in colonial
modernity do. The postmodern perception, originating in studies of literature, presents
modernity as passé, as a mode of thinking that has come and gone. Initially focusing on
modernity’s birth in the European Enlightenment, postmodernists typically address the
universalism and optimism present in modernist views in order to serve modernists a
dose of reality. While modernity was all about promise and progress, postmodernity is all
about dismantling the modern perspective because it is inherently problematic.
Postmodernity targets especially the naiveté and hubris of those who have sought to cre-
ate modernity, faults most modernists would never have suspected of themselves—and
quite probably would have been galled to discover. As such, postmodern scholarship
offers a useful corrective to accepted wisdom. The Japanese projects outlined here are
justifiably vulnerable to postmodern criticisms.
The postmodern approach, however, presents its own difficulties for the historian.
First, the logic of postmodernity assumes separate and identifiable stages in human histo-
ry, something anathema to historians. Second, there is a difference in orientation.
Postmodern theory consists mainly of critical reflection. Historians concerned with
modernity, however, seek to situate historical actors in particular milieus in order to
explain historical—and indirectly contemporary—contexts. To do this, however,
involves creating the modern today. This is because people now, as then, continue to cre-
ate the modern, even if some do so by resorting to self-described post-modern points of
view.
Be that as it may, the crucial question now is, can these two perspectives be bridged?
It seems that they can, because a wider definition of modernity—one including the dark-
er sides of this experience—also calls into question the modern project. Moreover, the
definition used here suggests that modernity still has yet to be reached—that contempo-
rary architects of society are still trying to define it.
The poet Shirotori Seigo ???? (1890-1973) was another fan of Walt Whitman’s,
publishing Japanese translations of what he thought were the seventy most representative
poems of Leaves of Grass in 1919. Shirotori liked Whitman for his honesty—Whitman
boldly explored human physicality without becoming blasphemous or coarse. At the
same time, Shirotori thought Whitman to be a practical idealist. It seemed to Shirotori
that Whitman’s Christian idealism and frank licentiousness united the Bible with
Homer, enabling his poetry to fuse objective science with religiosity, yet at the same time
demonstrate a democratic spirit.134 Shirotori’s later work showed similar inclinations. For
example, his 1926 compilation of Meiji and Taisho¯ poems and songs documented the
emergence of a new age in Japan, “the age of democratic poetry” (minshu¯shi jidai ???
??). This he thought began in earnest with the surge in popular spirit associated with
the outbreak of the First World War.135 In time, however, Shirotori’s own work demon-
strated another shift—he too came to extol the virtues inherent in the Japanese coloniza-
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tion of Manchuria. Indeed, he came to see Manchuria as a land ripe for the promise of
modernity.136
How does one make sense of poets like Shirotori? Was he so absent-minded as to not
notice Manchukuo’s problems when he visited the puppet state in 1939? Or was he so
enamored with modernity’s promise that he willingly looked the other way in the mean-
time? I suspect the latter to be the case.
Our task now is to consider the entirety of this modernist project—how bunmei kai-
ka included fukoku kyo¯hei, how a shining train network entailed racial hierarchy and a
privileged elite, and how pan-Asian “ethnic harmony” ended up being imbricated in a
police state and mass murder. Even if the links between progressive and cruel—even bar-
barous—activities are poorly understood, they are there. A Japanese historian once noted
that Manchukuo resembled the chimera, a composite beast, in its incorporation of a
variety of participants and goals.137 In a similar vein, a student of American history once
commented that revulsion against American foreign policy cannot be understood unless
the progressive aspects of American foreign policy are studied along with the injurious.138
In order to understand what modernity is—as well as what our relationship to it is—a
holistic perspective is necessary, and the only way to do that is through a more nuanced
understanding of the culture of modernity.
Or as Whitman observed, “The proof of the poet is that his country absorbs him as
affectionately as he has absorbed it.”139 Shirotori did not speak only for himself—he rep-
resents two generations that latched onto divergent Manchurian modernities, moderni-
ties that waves of prewar Japanese absorbed and sought earnestly to bring to fruition.
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NOTES
1 This and all subsequent quotations from the poem “Years of the Modern” (1891) are from Whitman
1982, pp. 597-8.
2 First published in 1855, Leaves of Grass went through five revisions by 1891. For a general discussion
of Whitman’s reception in Japan see Matsuhara 1957.
3 As suggested by the poet Arishima Takeo ???? (1878-1923) in Keene 1998, p. 478. Matsuhara
discusses Uchimura’s perceptions of Whitman in Matsuhara 1957, pp. 14-17.
4 Natsume 1892. A brief discussion of this article?which originally appeared in Tetsugaku zasshi ??
?? 7:68 (1892)?suggesting that it was Whitman’s egalitarianism that drew So¯seki most, can be
found in Keene 1998, p. 307.
5 Others impressed by Whitman included many of Japan’s up and coming literary elites, including
Kaneko Chikusui ???? (1870-1937), Takayama Rinjiro¯ ????? [Chogyu¯ ??] (1871-
1902), Asano Wasaburo¯ ????? (1874-1937), Noguchi Yonejiro¯ ????? (1875-1947), and
Osanai Kaoru ???? (1881-1928), as well as some who went on to form the Shirakaba ??
(“White Birch”) Society. On that group, see Matsuhara 1957 and Suzuki 1977. For Whitman’s
influence on Arishima Takeo, who founded a “Leaves of Grass” literary society in Japan, see also
Kunitomo 1938, pp. 180-185. A general discussion of the Shirakaba School in English with some
reference to Whitman is Keene 1998, pp. 441-505.
6 At least eighteen translations of Leaves of Grass appeared in Japan between 1919 and 1950.
Matsuhara 1957, p. 10.
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7 One example is Fukuda Masao ???? (1893-1952) 1916. Shirotori Seigo maintained that the
kind of free expressionism associated with Whitman became popular especially after 1907. Shirotori
1928, pp. 70-71.
8 Hearn once wrote that Leaves of Grass consisted of “an eccentric, tiresome, flatulent, raw volume of
rhapsodies.” Matsuhara 1957, pp. 12-14.
9 On Whitman’s exploitation of new daguerreotype images, see Hartnett 2002, especially chapter four:
“Whitman’s Pose, the Daguerreotype, and the Dialectics of Commodification, Self-Making, and
Democracy,” pp. 132-172. Matsuhara, however, notes that the first published photograph of
Whitman did not appear in Japan until 1901. Matsuhara 1957, p. 21.
10 “[T]he genius of the United States is not best or most in its executives or legislatures, not in its
ambassadors or authors or colleges or churches or parlors, nor even in its newspapers or
inventors...but always most in the common people.” Whitman 1982, pp. 5-6.
11 Matsuhara in particular reinforces the perception of Whitman as a prophet.
12 Garon 1994. In addition to calling attention to this issue in this article, Garon has also applied this
perspective in Garon 1987 and 1997. Other examples of this perspective are Minichiello 1998 and
Vlastos 1998.
13 While Japanese and Chinese texts typically put this term in quotation marks or prefix it with a char-
acter meaning “false” or “sham” (?), this essay does not follow either of these practices and follows
instead what is common practice in English language texts for reasons of simplicity only.
14 Although the labeling of the region as Manchuria encouraged the perception that it was an
autonomous entity, the term is rather problematic. Originally thought to designate the homeland of
the Manchus, in reality the western half included mainly lands belonging to Mongol allies. Its sup-
posed autonomy, moreover, ignored centuries of linkages established between residents of the region
and residents of China (and Korea). Despite this ambiguity, however, imperialist competition result-
ed in the term’s reification, though today Chinese do not use the term because of its connotations of
autonomy. An enlightening discussion of some Qing perceptions of Manchuria is Elliot 2000.
15 On this institution, see Coox 1989.
16 Ishida 1998 makes this point with regard to Korea—that policies of assimilation implemented there
coincided with the creation of citizens within Japan itself and are therefore interconnected.
17 Young 1998, p. 428.
18 This perspective was derived most notably from the series entitled Studies in the Modernization of
Japan, including Lockwood 1965, Ward 1968, Jansen 1969, Dore 1971, Morley 1971, and Shively
1971.
19 See, for example, the discussion in John Dower, “E. H. Norman and the Uses of History,” in Dower
1975, pp. 3-108.
20 For studies highlighting modernist impulses apparent in Japanese activities in Manchuria, see Tucker
1999, Sewell 2000, and Buck 2002. Studies in English concerned with the extension of modern
technology in the Japanese empire in Manchuria are Mimura 1998 and Yang 2003.
21 For general discussions of colonial modernity see Barlow 1997 and Wright 1991. For a discussion of
recent scholarship addressing colonial modernity in Korea see Matsumoto 2002.
22 Still the most useful texts in English outlining this event and the motivations behind it are Ogata
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1964 and Peattie 1975.
23 The Manchurian experience provides an especially insightful case study because Japanese attention
focused on Manchuria early in Japan’s quest for empire and remained steadfast until the dissolution
of that empire. Indeed, Young 1998 goes so far as to term Manchukuo the “Jewel in the Crown,”
though she was not the first to use the precious stone metaphor with regard to the puppet state. See
Collier and Malone 1936. Of course, the phrase was also long used by Britons to describe their
empire in India.
24 On Japanese perceptions of Manchuria since 1945, see Sewell 2003.
25 A popular definition of modernity used by sociologists, for example, includes the appearance of secu-
lar forms of political power and authority, the use of monetized patterns of commercial exchange, the
replacement of traditional social hierarchies with new class formations, and the decline of a religious
world view in favor of rationalist, individualistic, and materialist cultures. See Hall 1996, p. 8 and
passim. 
26 See, for example, Latour 1993.
27 Jeffrey Herf argues that “(t)here is no such thing as modernity in general. There are only national
societies, each of which becomes modern in its own fashion.” Herf 1984, p. 1.
28 An illustrative examination of the dilemmas faced by twentieth century Japanese intellectuals with
regard to defining modernity in Japan is Harootunian 2000. A more contemporary perspective con-
sidering shifting definitions of modernity in the People’s Republic of China is Rofel 1999.
29 See, for example, Irokawa 1985.
30 Many sources argue this, but some studies suggest more strongly independent Japanese creations of
the modern. See Howell 1995, Powelson 1997, and Yamamoto 1992.
31 Intriguingly, Abramovitz 1986 emphasizes the need for what Abramovitz calls “social capability” in
order to make technological catching up possible.
32 The Meiji Restoration of 1868 was practically simultaneous with events restructuring other societies
elsewhere to be more conducive to the growth of industrial capitalism. These included the creation of
constitutional government in Austria (1860) and the Dual Monarchy (1867), the emancipation of
Russian serfs (1861), and the unifications of Italy (1870) and Germany (1871).
33 On the built environment see Coaldrake 1996. Nor were Japanese alone among Asians in this
endeavor—see Aasen 1998.
34 Examples of this process can be found in Jansen and Rozman 1986. In the political sphere, debate of
course also sparked dissension and rebellion. See Bowen 1980.
35 Westney 1987.
36 Pollock 1986.
37 One early proponent of Japanese colonization did so not only because of apparent Japanese decline
but also explicitly because of British and Dutch maritime strength. See the discussion on Honda
Toshiaki (????, 1744-1821) in Keene 1969, pp. 104-6, 180-9.
38 A useful historical overview of the Japanese empire is Beasley 1987.
39 The Meiji government and academics at Tokyo University were the key people involved in introduc-
ing Spencer’s thought to Japan. Yamashita 1984 and Jansen 1984.
40 Jansen 1984. People like Seiji Hishida rationalized it this way: “Japan...today enjoys consular juris-
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diction in the territories of China, Korea and Siam, because her civilization is superior to theirs....It is
the desire of Japan to preserve in the Orient the national status of those of her sister Asiatic nations
which are not yet subjugated by foreign powers, and to lead them to that light of western civilization
which she is now enjoying without having abandoned her national individualism.” Hishida 1905,
pp. 255-256, 258-259.
41 Crowley 1966, Hackett 1971, Westney 1986.
42 Lynn 1998.
43 Ho 1984, Molony 1989, Wray 1984, Wray 1989.
44 Having served in the Sino-Japanese War, Takahashi helped draw up the surrender terms presented to
Li Hongzhang. He went on to become a legal scholar and a member of the House of Peers.
45 Takahashi’s ultimate solution to Russian expansion though was not through the use of force. Instead
he argued for the formation of a Chinese buffer state between the two empires, something he ratio-
nalized through European precedent dating back to the treaties of Utrecht and Westphalia. He envi-
sioned China’s new status as one protected by a four power treaty including Russia, Japan, Britain
and the United States. See Takahashi 1904, pp. 20-56. The Caroline incident involved a steamer
that had been taken by rebel forces and moored on an island in the river above Niagara Falls. During
a night assault, British marines captured the ship, burned it, and cast it over the falls. The British
commander’s version of events is Drew 1864.
46 Hishida 1905, p. 258. Hishida Seiji ???? inverted the order of his name when publishing in
English.
47 For example, the Japanese in China initially adopted the treaty-port model already in use.
48 From a base of 16,612 in 1906, the Japanese civilian population in Manchuria grew to 233,000 in
1930 and topped one million in 1940. Not all of these were immigrants, however, as many came
only to work temporarily. This means that more Japanese experienced life in Manchuria than these
numbers suggest. Manshikai 1964-65, vol. 1, p. 84 and Manshu¯ Iminshi Kenkyu¯kai 1976.
49 A brief overview of this organization is Nishizawa 2000.
50 On the difficulties Mantetsu faced, see Matsusaka 2001. The Japanese consular service itself was also
subject to internal frictions—see Brooks 2000.
51 Nor was Goto¯ an isolated figure. He was followed as Mantetsu president by Nakamura Zeko¯ (???
?, 1867-1927), a Finance Ministry bureaucrat who first worked with Goto¯ in the Taiwan civil
administration. Nakamura went on to serve as a minister in the Hara cabinet and mayor of Tokyo.
Other Mantetsu presidents were also noteworthy, including Matsuoka Yo¯suke (????, 1880-
1946), later foreign minister, who took Japan out of the League of Nations.
52 Kitaoka 1988 and Koshizawa 1988, pp. 9, 12-15, 61-7. The Toshi ko¯ron is still published today.
53 Kitaoka 1998, pp. 38-45.
54 Chen 1995.
55 Having written a preliminary proposal for Kodama entitled an Outline of Administrative Policy for
Manchuria (Manshu¯ keieisaku ko¯gai ???????), which focused first on the development of the
port at Dalian and a regional railway infrastructure, Goto¯ may not have initially wanted the chief
position for himself—his eye may have been on a position in Korea. See Kitaoka 1988, pp. 83-85.
However, having proved himself worthy of Kodama’s trust on Taiwan, Goto¯ received Kodama’s sup-
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port to become Mantetsu’s first president over the objections of Ito¯ Hirobumi ???? (1841-
1909). Citing American and British concerns, Ito¯ had wanted a different organizational approach,
one that entailed greater cooperation with Chinese, but Kodama asserted that a single Japanese
administration of the area would be more beneficial to all parties. See Beasley 1987, pp. 96-98.
56 A useful description of Russian-built Dalny is Cary 1903.
57 On the British East India Company as a model for Mantetsu see Manshikai 1964, volume 1, p. 30.
On the use of the Russian Chinese Eastern Railway, which used joint ventures with Chinese banks as
a tool of imperialist encroachment, as a model see Howe 1987.
58 The exact name of this institution changed often over its thirty-eight year life. A historical overview
of it can be found in Young 1966, but there are also many publications in Japanese that discuss it.
59 The train was of course also an important symbol of modernity in early Meiji.
60 Koshizawa 1986, Koshizawa 1988, Nishizawa 1996a, and Perrins 1997.
61 On Okada, see Nishizawa 1996b, pp. 17-18, 148. On Tatsuno, see Fujimori 1993, pp. 218-235. For
a discusssion of Tokyo Station see Coaldrake 1996, pp. 222-39. In designing Tokyo Station, then
director of the national railways Goto¯ Shimpei reportedly asked Tatsuno to make something that
would impress the world. See Seidensticker 1991, p. 78.
62 In 1910, twenty-two full and 268 part-time members of this association were listed as living in
Korea, Taiwan, and China—roughly thirteen percent of the total. This proportion increased over
time, as by 1942 these numbers increased to 496 full members and 1,999 part-time members, some
twenty percent of the overall figure. See Nishizawa 1996, pp. 3-4.
63 Initially published in 1921 as the Manshu¯ kenchiku kyo¯kai zasshi ????????.
64 Sewell 2000.
65 Koshizawa 1993, pp. 196-198.
66 Also known as Mukden ?? and Fengtian ??.
67 Koshizawa 1978, pp. 19-21.
68 This urban borderland is a subject as yet poorly understood and represents a great opportunity for
future research.
69 Buck 2002, p. 76 and South Manchuria Railway 1935, p. 11. On Changchun’s Mantetsu era history
see Koshizawa 1988 and Sewell 2000.
70 Although this discussion focuses on Mantetsu’s new railway cities, Goto¯ Shimpei initially hoped to
transform the Manchurian countryside as well, one of his goals being to encourage a half million
Japanese colonists to migrate to rural areas. That effort proved unsuccessful. See Goto¯ Shimpei, Goto¯
Shimpei den, as cited in Manshikai 1964, vol. 1, p. 32.
71 Koshizawa 1988, pp. 51-53.
72 On electrical infrastructure see Mantetsu 1929 and Mantetsu 1931.
73 Sato¯ 1985, pp. 81-82.
74 Matsumuro 1922.
75 Tanabe 1922.
76 Reports can be found in Mantetsu 1926, Mantetsu 1927, Mantetsu 1937a, and Mantetsu 1939.
Shorter, more specific reports are abundant.
77 For example, see South Manchuria Railway 1924.
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78 Dazai 1925, p. 11. Some began to write in this vein not long after the Japanese acquisition of the
railway. One wrote about Manchuria’s “inevitable development” (hitsuzen hassei????) and “final
destiny” (shu¯kyoku meiun????) as early as 1913. See Hatori 1913, pp. 466, 473.
79 See, for example, Kanto¯gun shireibu 1924, volume 2, p. 360, and Yamada 1926, volume 2, p. 24.
80 FO 262/1616/448.
81 Mantetsu 1939.
82 In addition to the continuing accounts of plague and cholera prevention in the series Reports on







89 Dower 1979, pp. 58-88.
90 Brooks 2000. 
91 Coox 1989, p. 407.
92 As these comments only outline the anxieties Japanese in Manchuria experienced in the years leading
up to the Manchurian Incident, a fuller treatment of this topic is currently the subject of an article in
preparation.
93 Lu 1997, pp. 382-4.





98 Johnson 1982, Nishizawa 1995.
99 One historian has suggested that Japanese activities in Manchukuo were more akin to Soviet activi-
ties in postwar eastern Europe than anything else. See Duus 1989, p. xxviii. I have suggested that it
could also have been similar to American efforts in Vietnam (Sewell 2000). 
100 Jansen 1984.
101 For a brief discussion of the kingly way as practiced see Mitter 2000, pp. 95-100.
102 Peattie 1975.
103 Mimura 1998.
104 Despite common perceptions of fascism as backwards, it is useful to recall that at the time of the
establishment of Manchukuo, fascism was often considered a progressive and even modern phenom-
enon. See Eley 1983, p. 71.
105 This is perhaps argued most specifically in Sewell 2000, but relevant details are also available in Buck
2002, Koshizawa 1988, and Tucker 1999.
106 Sewell 2000.
107 Komatsu 1932, pp. 5-9. Komatsu also referred to the attempt to gain Chinese cooperation by allow-
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ing them to buy shares of Mantetsu, neglecting to mention that not many could have afforded to do
so.
108 See also, for example, Bureau of Information 1938 and Collier and Malone 1936.
109 See Tucker 1999, chapter four: “City Planning as Architectural Modernism: Ideal Immigrant Farm
Villages and an Ideal Industrial City.”
110 According to Sato 1985, pp. 74, 77, the ratios of people to green hectare were Xinjing: 450, North
American cities: 400-500, European cities: 1,800-2,000, Tokyo: 10,700, and Kyoto: 40,800.
111 Sewell 2000 and South Manchuria Railway 1935, p. 6.
112 See, for example, Mantetsu 1935.
113 Aiga 1942, p. 7.
114 Naito¯ 1937, pp. 4-5.
115 Kishida 1942, p. 1.
116 Many examples of radical reformist thought in Japan appeared in the 1930s and 1940s. One example
including a demand for violent action, the wresting of power from the Caucasian societies, and the
creation of a new order based on a new kind of morality is Muto¯ 1937.
117 Hishida 1934, Hishida 1940.
118 Fogel 1988, p. 203 and Sewell 2003.
119 Mitter 2000.
120 This history remains to be written, at least in English, though some of it can be gleaned in Lee 1983.
121 Nor were these the only units guilty of mass what I judge to have been murder, as detachments of the
Imperial Japanese Army carried out executions and massacres telsewhere in the new state, such as at
Pingdingshan (???).
122 See Harris 1994, though there is much discussion of this in Japanese as well.
123 For example, see Ban 2001 on the Noborito Research Institute.
124 The Nomonhan Incident (May to September 1939) perhaps especially encouraged Japanese to
rethink their military capabilities. For a discussion of the Japanese weaknesses apparent in this con-
flict, see Coox 1985.
125 Francisco Goya’s (1746-1828) The Sleep of Reason Produces Monsters (1803) evokes this modern
predicament well: if one is not vigilant over the entirety of the project—which involves nothing less
than the reordering of a society’s way of living—who knows what may issue forth?
126 Young 1998.
127 As part of celebrations marking the tenth year of Manchukuo’s founding, in 1942 Ueshiba returned
to demonstrate his martial prowess for Puyi.
128 See, for example the six volume series Manshu¯ no tabi ???? published by Kokusho Kanko¯kai ?
???? in 1981 and 1982.
129 Asahi Shimbun 1983. For a review of this literature see Sewell 2003.
130 One example is Kokusai Zenrin Kyo¯kai 1975.
132 Johnson 1982.
132 The evidence linking Komatsu the Rotarian with the authorship of the article defending Japanese
actions in Manchuria is circumstantial.
133 Mitter 2000, Barrett and Shyu 2001.
Reconsidering the Modern in Japanese History 257
134 Shirotori 1919, pp. 6-8.
135 Intending his study to serve as a national primer (kokumin tokuhon????), Shirotori situated con-
temporary work within a review of “3000 years” of Japanese poems and songs. See Shirotori 1928,
pp. i-ii, 3-5, 79-80, and passim.
136 Shirotori 1940.
137 Yamamuro 1993.
138 Williams 1962, p. 9.
139 Whitman 1982, p. 26.
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